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Longitudinal surveillance of 2 live bird markets in Cambo-
dia revealed year-round, high co-circulation of H5, H7, and 
H9 influenza viruses. We detected influenza A viruses in 
51.3% of ducks and 39.6% of chickens, and co-infections, 
mainly by H5 and H9 viruses, in 0.8% of ducks and 4.5% 
of chickens.
A large variety of avian influenza viruses (AIVs) circu-late in live bird markets (LBMs) in countries where 
highly pathogenic influenza A(H5N1) viruses are endemic 
(1). The low pathogenicity AIVs A(H7N9) and A(H9N2) 
are also potential threats for global public health, related 
to the ability of these viruses to cause human infections 
in people in close contact with infected poultry (2). The 
segmented genomes of influenza A viruses indicate that 
co-infections can result in progeny with mixed genomes. 
Therefore, co-circulation of a large diversity of AIVs is a 
risk for emergence of novel reassortant viruses affecting 
animals, humans, or both.
Cambodia is a developing country in Southeast Asia 
that has a population of >15 million, of which 73% are de-
pendent on agriculture for their livelihood (3). The country 
is estimated to have a poultry population of ≈18 million 
chickens and ≈8 million ducks; most are raised in small 
backyard flocks (4). Poultry are generally transported on 
trucks and motorbikes into centralized LBMs, where they 
are slaughtered after being sold to customers (5). These 
LBMs have been established as critical for persistence, am-
plification, and dissemination of AIVs (6).
Surveillance studies in LBMs in Cambodia have re-
vealed some of the highest AIV detection rates in poultry 
globally (1,7). As of November 2017, a total of 56 human 
cases (including 37 deaths) and 49 poultry outbreaks of in-
fluenza A(H5N1) have been recorded in Cambodia (8–10). 
However, little is known about other AIV subtypes at risk 
for pandemic emergence, mainly H7 and H9. We investi-
gated the circulation of potentially highly pathogenic AIV 
subtypes (H5, H7, and H9), that have known public health 
risks in Cambodia LBMs during 2015.
The Study
We administered a longitudinal survey in 2 LBMs in the 
highly populated southeast region of Cambodia during 
February–December (weeks 7–53), 2015. Market 1 is a 
large LBM in central Phnom Penh that serves as a hub for 
poultry commerce in the southeast region. Market 2 is a 
smaller provincial market in Takeo Province. Weekly, we 
collected pooled oropharyngeal and cloacal swabs from 4 
chickens and 4 ducks, randomly selected, in each LBM. 
We also collected 50-mL samples of carcass wash water 
(CWW; large buckets of water that are used to wash freshly 
slaughtered poultry) weekly from each LBM. We trans-
ported samples at 4°C, immediately aliquoted them, and 
stored them at –80°C until testing.
In the Virology Unit laboratory of Institut Pasteur, 
Cambodia, we concentrated viruses in the CWW samples 
as previously described (11). We extracted viral RNA from 
CWW and swab samples by using the QIAamp Viral RNA 
Mini Kit (QIAGEN, Valencia, CA, USA), according to the 
manufacturer’s instructions. We then tested extracts for 
influenza A (M-gene) and subtypes H5 (primer sets H5a 
and H5b), N1, H7, and H9 by using quantitative RT-PCR 
(qRT-PCR) or conventional RT-PCR. The H5, H7, and 
H9 gene targets were all tested by using 2 separate assays 
to reduce the chances of false-negative results caused by 
the presence of single-nucleotide polymorphisms. Except 
for 1 of the H7 qRT-PCR and the H9 conventional RT-
PCR, the assays were sourced from the International Re-
agent Resource (https://www.internationalreagentresource.
org/Home.aspx) (12,13). For the qRT-PCR assays, cycle 
threshold values <38 were considered positive.
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Overall, we collected 940 samples, including 376 
chicken swab samples, 376 duck swab samples, and 188 
CWW samples. Testing identified AIV RNA year-round 
from 39.6% of chickens, 51.3% of ducks, and 93.1% of 
CWW samples (Table 1). We detected H5 in 16.8% of 
chickens, 20.5% of ducks, and 76.6% of CWW samples; 
H7 in 0.5% of chickens,  1.1% of ducks, and 2.1% of CWW 
samples; and H9 10.9% of chickens, 1.1% of ducks, and 
40.4% of CWW samples. Market 1 had a higher prevalence 
than market 2 of most viruses except H7 viruses, which 
were detected at similar rates in both markets. The higher 
rate of virus detection might be a result of the substantially 
larger size of market 1, which accommodated more diverse 
supply chains than did market 2.
Co-infections were more frequent among chickens 
(4.5%) than ducks (0.8%), and high viral loads (determined 
by qRT-PCR cycle threshold values <30) of co-infecting 
viruses were detected in many of the chicken samples 
(Table 2). Most co-infections detected were H5 and H9 vi-
ruses in chickens, particularly from market 1.
The H5 subtype (37.2% of birds) was detected much 
more frequently than N1 (16.5%) by using the subtype-
specific qRT-PCR assays. Previous studies have suggested 
that the sensitivities of M and H5 qRT-PCRs are higher 
than that for N1 (1). Isolation and sequence analysis of 
samples that were H5 positive and N1 negative revealed 
no evidence for circulation of non-N1 H5 strains. Similar-
ly, further investigations were undertaken to confirm that 
none of the H7 viruses were H7N9 or HPAI strains (data 
not shown). The circulation of Eurasian-lineage LPAI H7 
viruses in the region has been established through surveil-
lance in South Korea (14).
The peak in AIV and H5N1 circulation occurred dur-
ing February–April, with a secondary peak during Novem-
ber–December (Figure). Surveillance was not extended 
into January 2016; however, we assume that the peak 
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Table 1. Positivity rate for avian influenza viruses in live bird markets, Cambodia, February–December 2015* 
Type/subtype 
Market 1, Phnom Penh, no. (%) 
 
Market 2, Takeo, no. (%) 
 
Combined, no. (%) 
Chicken, n 
= 188 
Duck, n = 
188 
CWW,  n = 
94 
Chicken, n 
= 188 
Duck,  n = 
188 
CWW,  n 
= 94 
Chicken, n 
= 376 
Duck, n = 
376 
CWW,  n = 
188 
Influenza A 89 (47.3) 105 (55.9) 86 (91.5)  60 (31.9) 88 (46.8) 89 (94.7)  149 (39.6) 193 (51.3) 175 (93.1) 
 H5 41 (21.8) 53 (28.2) 71 (75.5)  22 (11.7) 24 (12.8) 73 (77.7)  63 (16.8) 77 (20.5) 144 (76.6) 
 N1 24 (12.8) 21 (11.2) 48 (51.1)  8 (4.3) 9 (4.8) 62 (66.0)  32 (8.5) 30 (8.0) 110 (58.5) 
 H7 1 (0.5) 2 (1.1) 1 (1.1)  1 (0.5) 2 (1.1) 3 (3.2)  2 (0.5) 4 (1.1) 4 (2.1) 
 H9 28 (14.9) 3 (1.6) 54 (57.4)  13 (6.9) 1 (0.5) 22 (23.4)  41 (10.9) 4 (1.1) 76 (40.4) 
Co-infections 15 (8.0) 3 (1.6) 44 (46.8)  2 (1.1) 0 20 (21.2)  17 (4.5) 3 (0.8) 64 (34.0) 
*By quantitative reverse transcription PCR. n values indicate number of samples. CWW, carcass wash water.  
 
 
Table 2. Avian influenza co-infections detected in poultry from live bird markets in Cambodia, February–December 2015* 
Sample 
code 
Market/ 
week Bird 
Cycle threshold values by quantitative RT-PCR H9 RT-
PCR¶ 
Co-
infections Influenza A†‡ H5a† H5b† N1† H7§ H7† H9†  
Z-47 M1/W9 C 18.72 18.96 ND 23.57 – – 20.37 + H5N1/H9 
Z-68 M1/W10 C 19.38 26.94 ND 25.41 – – 30.82 + H5N1/H9 
Z-104 M1/W12 D 24.13 32.73 30.74 32.90 – – 23.39 + H5N1/H9 
Z-138 M2/W13 C 26.02 28.04 25.84 25.37 – – 29.02 + H5N1/H9 
Z-150 M1/W14 C 34.25 27.01 39.76 – – – 34.47 + H5/H9 
Z-167 M1/W15 C 30.81 38.60 36.36 – – – 30.84 + H5/H9 
Z-169 M1/W15 C 27.83 37.93 35.08 – – – 27.58 + H5/H9 
Z-170 M1/W15 C 22.79 33.52 32.44 34.79 – – 25.65 + H5N1/H9 
Z-227 M1/W18 C 28.90 35.77 29.81 30.17 – – 30.60 + H5N1/H9 
Z-228 M1/W18 C 23.93 29.54 23.63 24.60 – – 29.84 + H5N1/H9 
Z-230# M1/W18 C 25.61 – 39.71 38.54 – – 22.65 + H5N1/H9 
Z-267 M1/W20 C 22.70 28.69 26.80 30.18 – – 27.66 + H5N1/H9 
Z-269# M1/W20 C 21.04 – – – – – 27.00 + H5N1/H9 
Z-430 M1/W28 C 23.79 – – – – 24.78 24.98 + H7/H9 
Z-466 M1/W30 D 32.56 40.93 – – – 34.72 36.00 + H7/H9 
Z-568# M1/W35 C 32.40 – 41.34 – – – 37.39 + H5N1/H9 
Z-748# M1/W44 C 21.05 – 35.44 37.75 – – 27.17 + H5N1/H9 
Z-824 M1/W48 D 19.40 17.20 23.82 25.38 – – 31.79 – H5N1/H9 
Z-858# M2/W49 C 18.41 40.23 – 24.02 – – 27.67 + H5N1/H9 
Z-909# M1/W52 C 24.14 38.03 39.37 – – – 29.88 + H5/H9 
*C, chicken; D, duck; RT-PCR, reverse transcription PCR; +, positive; –, negative. 
†US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention assays, available at the International Reagent Resource 
(https://www.internationalreagentresource.org/Home.aspx). 
‡All samples with an M gene quantitative RT-PCR cycle threshold value <38 were inoculated into embryonated chicken eggs to confirm avian influenza 
infection. 
§Van Borm et al. (13). 
¶World Health Organization (12). 
#Equivocal H5 or N1 results (defined by cycle threshold value >38) were subsequently confirmed by isolation of influenza A(H5N1) in embryonated chicken 
eggs (data not shown). 
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period extends from November through April, coinciding 
with the dry season in Cambodia. Similar seasonality of 
AIV circulation was observed in a longitudinal LBM study 
in 2013, in which February was also the month with the 
highest prevalence of AIV-infected poultry (1). Knowledge 
of this peak period of circulation is needed so that animal 
and human health authorities can target interventions to 
reduce AIV spread and human exposure. We detected H9 
circulation in chickens year-round, with no discernible sea-
sonality. H7 seasonality could not be determined because 
of the small number of viruses detected.
Conclusions
Throughout the study, we detected high levels of AIVs in 
2 LBMs in southeastern Cambodia. In 2013, our research 
team conducted a similar longitudinal AIV surveillance 
study that included the same 2 LBMs (referred to as M1, 
Phnom Penh, and M4, Takeo, in the 2013 study [1]). In that 
study, we detected AIVs in 32% of ducks, 18% of chickens, 
and 75% of CWW samples. This new study found a sub-
stantial increase in circulation of AIVs: 51% of ducks, 40% 
of chickens, and 93% of CWW samples. However, no cor-
responding increase in cases of H5N1 infection among hu-
mans was detected in Cambodia during 2015, possibly re-
lated to the replacement of the H5N1 clade 1.1.2 reassortant 
virus with an H5N1 clade 2.3.2.1c virus in early 2014.
The detection of co-infections in 4.5% of chickens 
during this study was cause for concern. Reassortment be-
tween H5N1 and other AIVs could produce novel viruses 
that have potential to cause epizootics or pandemic emer-
gence. Reassortment with the internal genes of H9N2 vi-
ruses has been linked to the emergence of numerous AIVs 
that raise public health concern, such as H5N1, H7N9, and 
H10N8 (15). In this study, only H5, H7, and H9 subtypes 
were screened, because strains of these viruses (particu-
larly H5N1, H7N9, and H9N2) are of leading global health 
concern. We would expect an even higher detection rate of 
co-infections if all AIV subtypes were tested.
In summary, we have documented a substantial in-
crease in the prevalence of AIVs in Cambodian LBMs from 
2011 (7) to 2013 (1) to 2015. We also have established that 
co-infections between AIVs commonly occur in the LBM 
environment and there is potential for emergence of novel 
viruses through reassortment. Interventions should be con-
sidered to decrease the prevalence of AIVs in LBMs to re-
duce the risk for emergence of novel viruses.
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Figure. Seasonality of avian 
influenza subtype circulation in 
live bird markets in Cambodia 
during 2015, as detected by 
quantitative reverse transcription 
PCR. A) Oropharyngeal and 
cloacal swabs from chickens; 
B) oropharyngeal and cloacal 
swabs from ducks; C) carcass 
wash water samples from 
pooled chickens and ducks after 
euthanization.
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